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CASENOTES
EDUCATIONAL TORT LAW - CAUSE OF ACTION FOR EDU-
CATIONAL MALPRACTICE REQUIRES INTENTIONAL AND
MALICIOUS CONDUCT BY SCHOOL OFFICIALS. Hunter v.
Board of Education, 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982).
A sixteen-year-old student, acting through his parents as next
friend, filed a six-count declaration against the Montgomery County
School Board and three professional employees of the Board' alleging
negligent evaluation of the student's learning abilities.2 The plaintiffs
further alleged that the individual educators intentionally and mali-
ciously supplied them with false information concerning the student's
learning disability and altered school records to cover up their actions.
The Circuit Court for Montgomery County held that public policy
barred the action and the court sustained the defendants' demurrer to
the complaint without leave to amend.4 The Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland affirmed.'
The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with the court of special
appeals that public policy barred an action for educational malpractice
based on negligence principles and affirmed the lower court's decision
with the exception of count II, which alleged an intentional tort.6 The
court held that public policy considerations are outweighed when the
cause of action is based on intentional and malicious conduct on the
part of school officials and such conduct would warrant recovery
against the individual officials.' The court cautioned that a plaintiff
will have a "formidable burden" in attempting to establish the intent
1. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 47 Md. App. 709, 710-11 nn. 3 & 4, 425 A.2d 681, 682
nn. 3 & 4 (198 1), rev'd in part, 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982). The professional
employees were the principal of the plaintiff's elementary school, an employee
who conducted diagnostic testing of the plaintiff in the second grade, and the
plaintiffs sixth grade teacher.
2. 292 Md. at 483-84, 439 A.2d at 583 (1982). The plaintiffs alleged the negligent
evaluation caused the student to repeat first grade materials while in the second
grade, and that this misplacement continued through subsequent grades causing
the student "to feel 'embarrassment,' to develop 'learning deficiencies,' and to ex-
perience 'depletion of ego strength.'" Id at 484, 439 A.2d at 583.
3. Id
4. 47 Md. App. at 711, 425 A.2d at 682 (1981), rev'd in part, 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d
582 (1982).
5. 47 Md. App. at 717, 425 A.2d at 685.
6. 292 Md. at 484-89, 439 A.2d at 583-86 (1982). The Court of Appeals of Maryland
reversed the decision of the court of special appeals concerning count II. Id at
490-91, 439 A.2d at 587. The case, reduced to its intentional tort aspects, is pend-
ing before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Hunter v. Board of Educ.,
No. 61-815 (Cir. Ct. Mont. Co. 1982).
In a subsequent decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, by a narrow 4-3
margin, affirmatively applied Hunter to hold that, absent willful or malicious con-
duct on the part of professional school board employees, the complaint of a for-
mer student and his parents alleging negligent evaluation and placement failed to
state a cause of action. Doe v. Board of Educ., 295 Md. 67 453 A.2d 814 (1982).
7. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 490, 439 A.2d 582, 587 (1982).
Hunter v. Board of Education
necessary for such a cause of action.8
Under the common law, parents alone had the duty to educate
their children,9 and because of immunities, no cause of action by chil-
dren against their parents existed for negligent or intentional torts. I0
Consequently, there was no cause of action for educational malpractice
under the common law. Even today, no jurisdiction has upheld an ac-
tion for educational malpractice based on negligence,"I nor has any
court outside Maryland held that an action for educational malpractice
can be based on an intentional tort theory. However, a New York
court implied in dicta that there might be liability when the alleged
actions constituted "gross violations of defined public policy."' 2
In Hunter v. Board of Education, 13 the court of appeals rationale
for allowing a cause of action for educational malpractice based on an
intentional tort theory is grounded in the court's reluctance to protect
individuals from liability for outrageous conduct. In the past, the court
has not allowed interspousal immunity"4 or parent-child immunity 5 to
preclude liability for intentional wrongdoing. Hunter, therefore, is a
natural extension of the court's decisions allowing recovery for outra-
geous conduct in areas where recovery is normally precluded for public
policy reasons.
The majority's rationale for denying a cause of action for educa-
tional malpractice based on a negligence theory is premised upon pub-
lic policy considerations.' 6 Since this was a case of first impression in
8. Id
9. Note, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District: New York Chooses Not to
Recognize "Educational Malpractice," 43 ALB. L. REV. 339, 343 (1979); Comment,
Schools and School Districts - Doe v. San Francisco Unified School District, Tort
Liability for Failure to Educate, 6 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 462, 471 (1975).
10. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 865 (4th ed. 1971).
11. See, e.g., D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska
1981); Smith v. Alameda County Social Serv. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 153
Cal. Rptr. 712 (1979); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal.
App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d
121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free
School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979); see also
Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979) (no cause of action for
educational malpractice in federal district court).
In Helm v. Professional Children's School, 103 Misc. 2d 1053, 431 N.Y.S.2d
246 (1980), the court extended its public policy argument from public schools to
private schools thereby precluding educational malpractice suits against private
schools. But see Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 110 Misc. 2d 314, 442 N.Y.S.2d 38
(1981) (allowed a cause of action based upon breach of contract and fraudulent
misrepresentation against a private school).
12. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 126, 400 N.E.2d 317, 320, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 (1979); see also Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist.,
47 N.Y.2d 440, 445, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979).
13. 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982).
14. See Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 88 (1978).
15. See Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951).
16. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 484-89, 439 A.2d 582, 584-86 (1982).
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Maryland, 7 the court of appeals relied heavily on cases decided in
Alaska,' 8 California,' 9 and New York.2" The court reviewed the public
policy considerations put forth by the courts in these states, including
the lack of a workable standard of care for teachers, the lack of cer-
tainty in establishing the cause and nature of any damages, the heavy
burden which would be inflicted on the limited resources of both the
public school system and the judiciary, and the possibility of the court's
interference with the school board's responsibility for the administra-
tion of the public school system.2'
Acknowledging the difficulties other courts have had in establish-
ing legal cause and measuring damages in educational negligence ac-
22tions, the Hunter majority reasoned that money damages were
inappropriate in such cases.23 The majority also asserted that allowing
negligence claims would require the court to act as monitors of both the
daily functioning and the policy formulation process of the educational
system.24 The court of appeals did not want to impose this responsibil-
ity on the court system, indicating that statutory authority25 and judi-
cial interpretation 26 give the State Board of Education "the last word
on any matter concerning educational policy or the administration of
the system of public education. "27
The Hunter majority additionally held that disputes concerning
placement and classification of public school students should be re-
solved by administrative procedures. 28 The court reviewed the scheme
provided by the legislature for examining placement decisions concern-
ing handicapped children and indicated that all such decisions are re-
viewable by the parent, the child, and the county superintendent. The
decisions are then appealable to the county board of education, the
state board of education, and if appropriate, the circuit court. The
court of appeals agreed with the intent of the legislature and the rea-
soning of the Alaska Supreme Court that it is preferable to settle dis-
putes concerning such decisions by informal means or in administrative
17. Id at 483, 439 A.2d at 583.
18. D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981).
19. Smith v. Alameda County Social Serv. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 712 (1979); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d
814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
20. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376
(1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
21. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 484-88, 439 A.2d 582, 584-85 (1982).
22. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Franscisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
23. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 487-88, 439 A.2d 582, 585 (1982).
24. Id at 488, 439 A.2d at 585.
25. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 2-106, 2-205 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
26. Resetar v. State Bd. of Educ., 284 Md. 537, 399 A.2d 225 (1979).
27. Id at 556, 399 A.2d at 235.
28. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 488-89, 439 A.2d 582, 586 (1982).
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hearings rather than by the post hoc remedy of civil litigation.29
Judge Davidson, in her dissenting opinion, agreed with the major-
ity's views concerning the viability of a cause of action for educational
malpractice based on an intentional tort theory,30 but disagreed with
the decision to deny a cause of action based on a negligence theory.3'
In establishing an applicable standard of care to determine if one
has acted negligently, the question of whether public school teachers
are professionals must first be confronted. 32 The majority never di-
rectly discussed this question.33 The dissent, however, argued that pub-
lic educators are professionals, based on the fact that they have special
training, are certified by the state, and hold themselves out as having
skills and knowledge which are not held by those outside the educa-
tional field.34 In establishing a standard of care, the dissenting judge
stated: "As professionals, [teachers] owe a professional duty of care to
children who receive their services and a standard of care based upon
customary conduct is appropriate. '35 Causation is considered in Judge
Davidson's opinion as follows:
There can be no question that negligent conduct on the part
of a public educator may damage a child by inflicting psycho-
logical damage and emotional distress. Moreover, from the
fact that public educators purport to teach, it follows that
some causal relationship may exist between the conduct of a
29. Id; see D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 557
(Alaska 1981).
30. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 491-92, 439 A.2d 582, 587 (1982) (David-
son, J., dissenting).
31. Id at 492, 439 A.2d at 588.
32. Berg v. Merricks, 20 Md. App. 666, 674, 318 A.2d 220, 226 (1974). Berg has been
interpreted to indicate that the Maryland courts recognize a need for a profes-
sional standard of care to measure teacher performance; see also Elsom, Common
Law Remedyfor the Educational Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teach-
ing, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 641, 727-30 (1978).
33. The commentators are split on the issue. For support for the proposition that
teachers are professionals, see Note, Educational Malpractice." Can the Judiciary
Remedy the Growing Problem of Functional Illiteracy, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 27
(1979). "Although definitions of a profession often exclude education, courts have
described educators as professional, and public policy considerations support this
proposition." Id at 41. But see Halligan, The Functions of Schools, The Status of
Teachers and The Claims of the Handicapped- An Inquiry into Special Education
Malpractice, 45 Mo. L. REv. 667, 675 (1980). In his discussion, Halligan states:
The role of a teacher is important, even critical. But it is not professional
in the sense intended by the law of malpractice. It is not a learned pro-
fession. It is governed by hierarchical bureaucracies and not by the pro-
fession itself. It is a role in which the discretion of individual performing
members is closely limited and does not require trust and confidence in
the same manner that the work of a physician or lawyer requires them
... . [The duty of a teacher is to follow the orders of superiors.
Id at 676-77.
34. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 495, 439 A.2d 582, 589 (1982) (Davidson,
J., dissenting).
35. Id at 496, 439 A.2d at 589.
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teacher and the failure of a child to learn.36
Thus, Judge Davidson clearly states that teachers are professionals,
have a professional duty of care, and that a causal relationship might
exist between a teacher's conduct and the failure of a pupil to learn.
The primary elements of a negligence action are standard of care
(duty) and proximate cause (breach of duty) leading to the plaintiffs
injury.37 A plaintiff in a claim for educational malpractice who estab-
lishes the elements of a negligence cause of action should be entitled to
relief and should be compensated for the injury by being placed in the
same position as if the injury had not occurred. If the plaintiff is still a
student, he should be offered the necessary remedial education, or the
cost of procuring the remedial education, plus compensation for any
emotional distress. If the plaintiff has already graduated or otherwise
left the school system, he should be compensated for the difference be-
tween what he would have earned had he not been negligently taught
and what he actually earns, plus the cost of remedial education and
compensation for emotional distress. To determine the salary a student
would have earned had he not been negligently taught, reference can
be made to the many national, state, and local salary surveys conducted
in most occupations.38 The majority expressed concern for the burden
educational malpractice actions could place on a school system's lim-
ited resources. This burden can be lessened through the purchase of
malpractice insurance, 39 and the system's liability could be limited to
the amount of premiums paid for the insurance.4°
The prediction that school boards and courts will be inundated
with suits is speculative, at best. Plaintiffs will have a heavy burden in
showing causal relationship and injury, and defendants will have all
the usual defenses including contributory negligence. For instance, a
student's attendance, attitude, and record of performance with respect
to homework will be matters of proof, as will the defendant's claim that
other forces, such as homelife or peer group pressures, influence a
youngster's performance in school. Refusing legitimate relief seems to
imply a lack of trust in our educational system and protecting educa-
tors from legitimate causes of action seems to imply that educators are
36. Id ; accord Note, Educational Malpractice Can the Judiciary Remedy the Growing
Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 27, 45-48 (1979).
37. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
38. Eg., Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Area Wage Survey: Balti-
more, Maryland, Metropolitan Area, Bulletin No. 3000-38 (1980) (available from
Depository Libraries).
39. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 4-105 (1978 & Supp. 1982) (authorizes purchase of in-
surance by county boards of education).
40. If a county board of education purchases insurance with a minimum liability cov-
erage of at least $100,000 per occurrence, the "board may raise the defense of
sovereign immunity to any amount claimed above the limit of its insurance policy
... " Id § 4-105(d).
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lesser professionals than lawyers, 4' doctors,42 architects, 43 account-
ants,44 building contractors, 45 and surveyors,46 all of whom can be held
liable for professional malpractice.
The majority held that there were adequate internal administrative
procedures for review of student placement and classification. 47 Fur-
thermore, the majority feared that permitting a negligence cause of ac-
tion would force the courts to monitor both the daily functioning and
the policy formulation process of the educational system. 48 The dissent
disagreed and stressed that merely because "the Legislature has dele-
gated authority to administer a particular area to certain administrative
agencies should not preclude judicial responsiveness to individuals in-
jured by unqualified administrative functioning. In recognizing a
cause of action. . this [cjourt would. . . provide a remedy to a per-
son harmed by the negligent act of another. '49 The dissent disputed
the adequacy of the available administrative procedures and stressed
the need for a cause of action to meet the deficiency." The dissent's
argument is more persuasive since the internal procedures relied upon
by the majority are not appropriate to remedy the harm caused by a
misplacement or a misclassification which occurred years in the past.
Rather, they are designed to review recent placement decisions and
classifications.
While the court's decision is in accord with the decisions of the
other three jurisdictions which have decided the question, 5' several
commentators argue for allowing a cause of action for educational mal-
practice based on negligence.12 Such a cause of action should be per-
mitted with the remedy restricted to remedial education and limited
damages. Damages should be available only for lost wages while the
41. E.g., Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969).
42. For physicians, surgeons, and other medical personnel, see the cases cited in 18
M.L.E., Physicians & Surgeons § 31 (1961 & Supp. 1982).
43. Cf. Steelworkers Holding Co. v. Menefee, 255 Md. 440, 258 A.2d 177 (1969).
44. Eg., Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 288, 257 A.2d 421 (1969).
45. Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222, 285 A.2d 612 (1972).
46. Cf. Downs v. Reighard, 265 Md. 344, 289 A.2d 299 (1972).
47. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 488-89, 439 A.2d 582, 586 (1982).
48. Id at 488, 439 A.2d at 585.
49. Id at 497-98, 439 A.2d at 590 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
50. Id at 497, 439 A.2d at 590.
51. D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981);
Smith v. Alameda County Social Serv. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 712 (1979); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d
814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400
N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School
Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
52. Note, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District - New York Chooses Not
to Recognize "Educational Malpractice," 43 ALB. L. REV. 339, 358-59 (1979);
Note, Nonliability for Negligence in the Public Schools - "Educational Malprac-
tice"from Peter W. to Hoffman, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 814, 831-33 (1980); Note,
Educational Malfeasance: 4 New Cause of Action for Failure to Educate?, 14
TULSA L.J. 383, 400 (1978).
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student is being re-educated or for the difference between wages earned
and wages that would have been earned if the plaintiff had been prop-
erly educated originally, plus compensation for any emotional distress.
In this way, frivolous or fraudulent cases will be discouraged and an
equitable solution will be offered to the truly deserving without overly
straining the resources of local boards of education. While the Hunter
decision is correct with respect to intentional torts, and the majority
and minority opinion agree on this issue, the Maryland courts should
permit a cause of action for educational malpractice based on negli-
gence, with limitations on recovery as suggested.
Michael Morucci
